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INTRODUCTION

In September 2009, the United States Air Force (USAF) graduated its
first pilot training class that did not receive flight training.1 These pilots are
not headed for the cockpit but to the controls of an unmanned aircraft
system (UAS). In 2009, the USAF trained more UAS pilots than fighter or
bomber pilots2 in an attempt to meet what the former commander of United
States Central Command labeled an “insatiable need” for UAS.3 While the
UAS “surge” began under President Bush, President Obama is expanding
both UAS acquisition and their use.4 The proposed 2011 defense budget
would double UAS production and for the first time the USAF will order
more UAS than manned aircraft.5
While UAS are now ubiquitous on the modern day battlefield,6 the
disagreement and controversy surrounding them continues to grow. One
commentator referred to UAS as “armed robotic killers,”7 while a senior
analyst at Human Rights Watch described them as the weapon system most

1. Gordon Lubold, US Air Force’s Class of 2009: Pilots Who Won’t Fly , THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 28, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/military/2009/
0928/p02s04-usmi.html.
2. Fred Kaplan, Attack of the Drones, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.
newsweek.com/id/215825/page/1.
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IMPROVED STRATEGIC AND ACQUISITION PLANNING CAN HELP ADDRESS EMERGING CHALLENGES 2, available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05395t.pdf (testimony of Sharon Pickup and Michael Sullivan)
[hereinafter GAO report]. Central Command is the command responsible for the wars in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, the current commander of Central Command, said
in January 2010 that “[w]e can’t get enough drones.” P.W. Singer, Defending Against Drones
How Our New Favorite Weapon In The Way On Terror Could Soon Be Turned Against Us,
NEWSWEEK, March 8, 2010, available at http://www newsweek.com/id/234114.
4. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are The Risks Of The CIA’s Covert Drone
Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2009, at 37, available at http://www newyorker.com/
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (reporting that in President Obama’s first nine and
half months in office he authorized as many UAS strikes as President Bush did in his last three
years in office).
5. Julian Barnes, Pentagon Increases Drone Fleet in New Budget, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 2,
2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010954876spenddig
02 html.
6. The United States Army reported a 400 percent increase in the amount of UAS flight
hours from 1999 to 2009. J.D. Leipold, Army to Increase Medevac Support, Add New CAB, More
UAVs, ARMY NEWS SERV., Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.army mil/news/2010/01/07/
32603-army-to-increase-medevac-support-add-new-cab-more-uavs/. In 1999, three UAVs flew
500 hours, compared with 1,700 UAVs flying more than 180,000 hours in 2009. Id.
7. John Pike, Coming to the Battlefield: Stone-Cold Robot Killers, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2009, at B3. Pike, the director of the military information website GlobalSecurity.org claims that
“[w]ithin a decade, the Army will field armed robots with intellects that possess, as H.G. Wells
put it, ‘minds that are to our minds as ours are to those of those of the beasts that perish, intellects
vast and cool and unsympathetic.’” Id.
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capable of destruction he has ever seen.8 Much of the recent controversy
and associated disagreement involves armed UAS launching missile attacks
at al Qaeda and Taliban targets in the northwest portion of Pakistan.9
The disagreements manifest themselves in varying conclusions on the
legality of a given UAS strike in Pakistan. Yet, that overt disagreement on
the answer to the legality question masks that the various participants in the
discussion are utilizing wholesale different methodologies and talking past
each other in the process. Some speak in terms of how the United Nations
Charter governs the overarching question of legality; others claim that the
Charter provides only some of the framework; and still others posit that the
Charter does not meaningfully apply at all.10 This divergence leads to
correspondingly varied answers as to what extent the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) or human rights law applies to the use of force through the United
States engaging targets in Pakistan. These answers range from the characterization of the conflict in Pakistan as a war and UAS strikes as “just the
killing of the enemy, wherever and however found” to the same strike being
labeled extrajudicial killings, targeted assassination, and outright murder.11
This article assesses the legality of armed UAS strikes in Pakistan
through two normative constructs. The first is jus ad bellum, the law governing resorting to force. The second is jus en bello, the law governing the
actual conduct of hostilities.12 Together, the two constructs comprise what
8. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, THE NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2009, at
41 (quoting Marc Garlasco of Human Rights Watch).
9. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedermann, Revenge of the Drones An Analysis of the Drones
Strikes in Pakistan, NEW AM. FOUND., Oct. 19, 2009, at 1 (claiming “that [a]n important factor in
the controversy over [drone attacks] is the widespread perception that they kill large number of
Pakistani civilians”). Yet the attacks are perceived as effective, a point demonstrated by a recent
al Qaeda attack. The site al Qaeda selected for a January 2010 suicide bombing was a United
States Central Intelligence Agency base near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, a base which
purportedly oversaw UAS attacks. Joby Warrick & Pamela Constable, Attacked CIA Facility
Supported Drone Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1. The attack killed seven CIA officers
in the deadliest single attack against the CIA since the 1983 combing of the United States
Embassy in Beirut. Id.
10. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J.
TRANS. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1520717##.
11. James Kitfield, Wanted: Dead, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 21 (quoting the former CIA
counter-terrorism chief for the wartime characterization).
12. See Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in
Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, YALE J. OF INT’L L. 541, 541-42 (2009). While acknowledging
that the two norms are logically independent, Benvenisti raises some interesting questions as to
the logic of that dichotomy given the influence of jus ad bellum considerations in jus in bello
analysis, particularly as applied to nonstate actors. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation:
Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34
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is referred to as the LOAC.13 Unlike broader or more general legal constructs, the LOAC governs a specific subject matter, the use and application
of force during armed conflict. This article considers both the question of
the lawfulness of UAS strikes and the manner in which they occur through
a LOAC prism.
This article also seeks to add clarity to the conversation by outlining
the different levels of analysis utilized to assess UAS strikes as a use of
force and how those levels lead to disagreement and misunderstanding well
beyond differing conclusions on legality. The article begins by defining a
UAS and discussing its prevalence around the world. Utilizing a recent
UAS strike in Pakistan, the article then reviews the international law
framework applicable to the use of armed UAS. The article then considers
the associated LOAC targeting principles applicable to such a strike,
exploring how in some ways UAS strikes are preferable compared to
traditional aerial bombing, but in others less so. The article determines that
while how one characterizes the conflict in Pakistan, internally and via the
United States, and whether Pakistan has consented to the strikes, trigger
different analytical frameworks; however, the conclusion is the same—that
the UAS strikes are lawful. Yet ultimately, the current level of discourse
demonstrates that constructive debate is needed, not just on UAS strike
legality, but on the appropriate legal framework through which such
conclusions are reached.
II. BACKGROUND OF UAS
A. WHAT IS AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM?
For the purposes of this article, the terms UAS, unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), and drone are synonymous. The term UAS reflects the
United States Army’s current terminology.14 The Department of Defense

YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 50 (2009) (labeling the requirement that jus ad bellum and jus in bello be
considered separately a dualistic axiom, which Sloane asserts is logically questionable).
13. See DAVID P. CAVALERI, THE LAW OF WAR: CAN 20TH-CENTURY STANDARDS APPLY
TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM? 9 (Combat Studies Institute Press), available at
http://www.au.af mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi_cavaleri_law.pdf (tracing the development of just
war theory including how, in the 17th century, Hugo Grotius, one of the founders of modern
international law, expanded the list of principles of just war—jus ad bellum—to include fighting
the war in a just manner, beginning the concept of jus in bello in the process). The Department of
Defense defines the LOAC as “[t]hat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
hostilities.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, ¶ 3.1 (2006) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE
2311.01E].
14. Christopher B. Carlile, Leading the Army’s UAS Synchronization Efforts, ARMY MAG.,
Jan. 2010, at 35 (describing the development of the United States Army’s Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama).
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still uses the term UAV, which it defines as “[a] powered, aerial vehicle
that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable
or recoverable, and [ ] carr[ies] a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or
semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not
considered unmanned aerial vehicles.”15 Within the current United States
inventory, UAS range in size from the Wasp and the Raven, at 38 inches
long, both of which are “launched” by being thrown in the air by hand, to
the twenty-seven foot long Predator and the forty-foot long Global Hawk.16
The UAS capable of carrying weapons generally carry “Hellfire” missiles.17
This section should perhaps be titled “What is an UAS Now,” given
how different future systems may be from those at issue today. In his book,
Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century, P.W. Singer details the UAS likely to be utilized in future
conflicts.18 These include a UAS which could remain airborne for up to
five years; a high altitude airship “parked” as high as one hundred thousand
feet up; micro-UAS the size of insects, and “robo-lobsters” and other
drones intended for use at sea.19 This evolution will render the associated
legal analysis that much more difficult, reinforcing the imperative to reach
consensus on the framework of that analysis. Before discussing that
framework, the proliferation of UAS bears mention.

15. JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 577 (2001). The distinction between autonomously and remotely piloted
UAVs is that “[a]n autonomously piloted UAV is one that is pre-programmed for its mission
before it takes off. It then flies its mission without a ground-based pilot. A remotely piloted UAV
is controlled by a pilot in a control station on the ground during the flight.” GAO report, supra
note 3, at 4 n.5.
16. Singer, supra note 8, at 37-39.
17. Hellfire is an air-to-ground missile system which uses laser guidance and a roughly
twenty pound warhead to defeat tanks and other individual targets. Hellfire History, Redstone
Army Arsenal, http://www redstone.army mil/history/systems/HELLFIRE html (last visited Mar.
9, 2010). Each missile costs some $58,000. The United States utilizes the Hellfire on a variety of
weapons platforms. Sweden, Israel, and Egypt also use the system. Development of the Hellfire
began over 40 years ago; so, not surprisingly, the United States military recently announced the
Joint Air-to Ground Missile (JAGM) as the successor to the Hellfire missile as the armament for
at least one model of UAVs, the Sky Warrior Extended Range Multi Purpose UAV. Scott
Gourley, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), ARMY MAG., Dec. 2009, at 59. The JAGM will
be fielded in 2016 and offers increased range and accuracy over the Hellfire. Id. The extent to
which this increased capability will alter what is feasible as well as required under IHL is beyond
the scope of this article.
18. Singer, supra note 8, at 25.
19. Id. at 39-40.
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B. WHO HAVE UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS?
Much of the UAS attention centers on the United States, and perhaps
Israel, as the only countries that employ armed UAS. Yet at least forty-four
countries have UAS.20 While those countries currently employ UAS as
surveillance platforms, most have the capability for armed UAS. The fact
that countries around the world possess UAS is not new; yet the
manifestations of that proliferation still seem surprising—that Iran utilizes
UAS, which became obvious in the spring of 2009 when United States
forces shot down an Iranian UAS in Iraq,21 or that Hezbollah’s UAS
capability dates back to at least 2004.22 Unmanned aircraft systems are
very much a global business; a British company manufacturers engines for
Israeli UAS,23 while Israel in turn sells UAS to Russia.24
Another example of where UAS proliferation can be found is Canada.
Canada is participating in combat operations in Afghanistan as part of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization force. In support of those operations,
Canada is leasing Israeli-made “Heron” model UAS.25 Although the Heron
is capable of carrying weapons, Canada elected not to arm them. Yet
Canada recently announced its intention to expend $500 million to acquire
and employ armed UAS, to which the head of the Canadian Air Force
added:
What we have to be very mindful of is that Canada very much
respects the law of armed conflict and you have to satisfy a
number of conditions before you drop a weapon on anything . . . .
20. See Scott Shane, Effective Yet Controversial, Drones are Here to Stay, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 3, 2009, at 6 (quoting P.W. Singer). The wide range of other countries with UAS
include Belarus, China, India, Pakistan and Russian to name just a few. Singer, Defending Against
Drones, supra note 3. Singer claims that “two thirds of worldwide investment in unmanned
planes in 2010 will be spent by countries other than the United States.” Id. Further demonstrating
the ubiquitous nature of UAS, Singer documents how an editor for Wired magazine built a handtossed UAS for $1000 and “an Arizona-based anti-immigrant group instituted its own pilotless
surveillance system to monitor the United States Mexico border for just $25,000.” Id.
21. Waleed Ibrahim & Missy Ryan, US Forces Shot Down Iranian Drone Over Iraq,
REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2009, available at http://www reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52F2ZL20090316.
22. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Mosquito Through a Net,” UAV Finds Flaw in Israeli Air
Defenses, DEFENSE NEWS, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1. While the Hezbollah UAS were primitive, that
proved to be an advantage of sorts. The drones were so slow that Israeli jets stalled trying to slow
down enough to be able to shoot them down. Singer, Defending Against Drones, supra note 3.
23. David Pallister, British Link With Drone Aiding the Israeli War Effort, THE GUARDIAN,
Jan. 9, 2009, at 20.
24. Israel Sells UAVs to Russia, On Condition, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 26, 2009,
available at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/06/26/Israel-sells-UAVs
-to-Russia-on-condition/UPI-85331246030604/.
25. See Canada to Acquire Attack Drones: Air Chief, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 6, 2009,
available at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/06/cdn-drones.html (describing the Heron
lease as two years long and costing $94 million).
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And in the case of the UAV, those conditions will be very difficult
to satisfy, but it will also be a very useful option to have.26
Canada’s willingness to expend half a billion dollars on a combat system,
the legal use of which it seems to question, is emblematic of the important
role UAS play, and will continue to play, on the battlefield. It also speaks
to the confused state of the legal analysis surrounding UAS, confusion that
is unnecessarily increased when considering who controls the UAS.
C. SETTING THE STAGE
The current controversy surrounding UAS strikes focuses on the
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of northwest Pakistan, which
runs along the eastern border of Afghanistan. In the FATA, Pakistan is
engaged in a conflict with a combination of tribal groups, al Qaeda, and
both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.27 These groups are, in one sense,
disparate entities with differing objectives, but for the purposes of this
article will be collectively referred to as insurgents or organized armed
groups. The conflict within the FATA dates back to at least 2004 and has
involved over a 100,000 Pakistani troops and members of Pakistan’s
frontier corps on one side and up to an estimated 20,000+ insurgents on the
other. The insurgents have controlled territory within the FATA and killed
over 2,200 members of the Pakistani military.28 While the intensity of the
conflict has varied, the engagements between Pakistani forces and these
organized armed groups operating within Pakistan have been characterized
as offensives, battles, and indeed even outright war.
The insurgents pose a threat to Pakistan and, owing to their cross
border operations, also to both United States and Afghan forces in adjacent
Afghanistan. As President Obama stated, “[t]here is no doubt that the
United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.”29 Consider the former
leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in an
August 2009 UAS strike in Pakistan. At that time, the Pakistani Taliban
had some 16,000 fighters, and while most of them were Pakistani, some
4,000 were Arabs and Central Asians.30 Mehsud was the purported
architect of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto and the bombing of a hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than 50
26. Id. (quoting Canadian Lieutenant General Angus Watt).
27. See Sean Murphy, The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations
From Afghanistan Into Pakistan, 84 INT’L L. STUDIES 111, 113 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009).
28. See Pamela Constable and Haw Nawaz Khan, U.S. Drone Attack May Have Killed
Leader of Pakistani Taliban, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2010, at A16.
29. Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 14.
30. Id. at 14.
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people,31 which led to him being described as Pakistan’s top public
enemy.32 But Mehsud is also believed to have orchestrated numerous suicide bombings against the United States in Afghanistan,33 against whom he
declared a jihad.34 Mehsud’s actions, and those of other similarly situated
(and acting) insurgents in the FATA, provide the backdrop for considering
the legality of the United States response—armed UAS strikes.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED UAS
IN PAKISTAN
A. JUS AD BELLUM
Assessing the lawfulness of the UAS strikes first requires
characterizing the nature of the conflict. While such a characterization
sounds easy enough, as applied to the FATA, it is anything but. There
would appear to be at least three characterizations of the conflict: (1) a
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the United States and
Afghanistan on one side and organized armed groups operating from the
FATA35 on the other, leading to an inherently confusing term, “internationalized” NIAC; (2) a NIAC between Pakistan on one side and the
same organized armed groups operating from the FATA on the other; (3)
international armed conflict (IAC) between Afghanistan and the United
States on one side and if not Pakistan directly, Pakistan’s agents or proxies
on the other.
While noting Pakistan’s intelligence service support of the Taliban, at
least prior to September 11th,36 this article does not further consider the
concept of an IAC between the United States and Pakistan because recent
Pakistani attacks on the Taliban undermine any agency or proxy argument.
Instead, this article considers the lawfulness of UAS strikes within the two
variants of NIAC. While the variants and the analysis that flows are not
mutually exclusive by any means, they are treated as such to provide a
clearer analytical framework. The reality seems to be a hybrid of the two

31. See Constable & Khan, supra note 28 (describing how a UAS attack may also have
killed Mehsud’s successor as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban).
32. Haq Nawaz Khan & Pamela Constable, Pakistani Taliban in Dire Position, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2010, at A1.
33. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9.
34. Harris, supra note 29, at 26.
35. The absence of a state on both sides of the conflict would preclude the characterization of
the situation as an international armed conflict.
36. See Jayshree Bajoria, The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., May 28, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/ (describing
support by Pakistani’s military intelligence of the Afghan Taliban).
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NIAC variants, meaning that Pakistan is engaging in an internal fight, and
aspects of that fight cross the border with Afghanistan, and impact the
United States and its Afghan and NATO allies. Perhaps more accurately
that is the “U.S. reality” as the Europeans purportedly recognize
Afghanistan, but not Pakistan, as a designated combat zone.37
1.

“Internationalized NIAC”

Under this characterization, United States forces in Afghanistan are
engaged in a conflict with insurgents operating in and from the FATA.
Additionally, Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to control the insurgents
or at least prevent their use of force outside the borders of Pakistan. To
further distinguish this NIAC characterization, assume that Pakistan does
not consent to the UAS strikes within its borders. Finally, this article
assumes the purpose of UAS strikes is a preemptive or preventive action
against prospective hostile acts the target is likely to commit in the future.38
The starting point for the analysis under these circumstances is the
United Nations Charter.39 In Article 2(4), the Charter states that “[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”40 But this prohibition on the use of force is balanced against, and
even subordinate to, Article 51, which provides in pertinent part that
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations . . . .”41
That the Charter acknowledges not just a right to self defense but that
such a right is an inherent one is notable. The acknowledgment reflects and
37. Harris, supra note 29, at 6 (quoting two former British security officials as stating that
the UAS strikes “epitomize the difference between the American and European approaches” to
counterterrorism).
38. The alternative to the assumption that UAS strikes are preemptive is that the strikes
might be reactive, punitive, and action-based on the target’s prior acts. Such targeting would
constitute a reprisal, a controversial issue in and of itself, and beyond the scope of this article.
Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 382-86 (2009) (explaining
and distinguishing reprisal from the concept of reciprocity).
39. But see O’Connell, supra note 10, at 16.
40. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
41. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). Article 51 continues:
[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Id.

658

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:649

codifies that for centuries before the Charter, states used force to defend
their natural interests in ways the international community considered
legitimate. Thus, the use of force in self-defense both precedes and survives the Charter. As such, the use of force in self-defense is subsumed by
Article 51 and may be considered lawful. Specifically, pre-Charter use of
force varied in both manner and level of acceptance. Even among advocates of the general proposition, the kinds of force that precede and survive
the Charter is debated.42 One such use of force potentially relevant to this
discussion is the principal of “self-help” whereby a state uses force in
defense of its nationals.43
In a December 2009 presentation to the American Society of International Law, Georgetown Professor David Luban explained his view that the
inherent right of self-defense is a preemptive one, extending at least as far
as the parameters of the Caroline test.44 Here Luban refers to a 19th
century attack by the United Kingdom of a United States steamship, the
Caroline. The British claimed self-defense as the basis of their attack of the
Caroline, which was intermittently used in support of Canadian insurrection
against Britain. Daniel Webster, then United States Secretary of State,
articulated what became the Caroline test in 1841.45 Webster stated that the
“necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”46 Luban labels the use
of force under such circumstances preemptive, and argues that the conditions of imminence and necessity have led to wide acceptance.47 He contrasts this with preventive use of force, where an attack is anticipated but
not imminent. Luban contends the consensus view is that Article 51 does
not include a preventive use of force.48
42. See Robert Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in
Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS
ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 67 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT’L L. STUDIES 43, 62-64 (Albert R
Coll et al. eds.) (1992). Turner outlines the history, and scope, of the right of self-defense. He
contends that “the nature of the wrongful act” dictates the classification of the response and lists
retorsion, reprisal, self-help and self-defense as examples.
43. The concept of self-help might apply to the United States’ use of force in the FATA to
protect Americans in Afghanistan. The self-help aspect would derive from Pakistan’s
unwillingness or inability to prevent the attacks from the FATA into Afghanistan.
44. David Luban, Preventative War and the U.N. Charter, Presentation to the American
Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 2009) (on file with author).
45. The Caroline, 2 J. MOORE, DIG. OF INT’L L. 409, 412 (1906) (describing the exchange of
diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United States in 1842).
46. Id.
47. See Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV., 699, 699719 (2005) (describing the doctrine’s evolution and four schools of thought on its parameters: the
strict constructionist school, the imminent threat school, the qualitative threat school, and the
“[U.N.] charter is dead” school).
48. Luban, supra note 44.
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Yet Luban acknowledges how the founders of natural law struggled
with the boundaries of self-defense. Alberico Gentile, one of the first professors of international law, stated that “[w]e ought not wait for violence to
be offered us, it is safer to meet it halfway. No one ought to expose himself
to danger. No one ought to wait to be struck, unless he is a fool.”49
Reduced to a maxim, under Gentile, “[a] defense is just which anticipates
dangers that are . . . probably and possible.”50 To this, Swiss philosopher
Emer Vattel added the concept of proportionality,51 that the justification for
“forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of the probability attending to it, and to the seriousness of the evil with which it is threatened.”52
There is an interesting parallel between the 250 year-old musings of
European philosophers and the United States’ post 9/11 National Security
Strategy. Under that strategy, “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk
of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy’s attack.”53 Also, the strategy provides an open
acknowledgement that the United States must act “against such emerging
threats before they are fully formed.”54
Applied to the FATA, the circumstances seem to meet a preventive but
not preemptive threshold. While the circumstances leading up to a UAS
strike are largely unknown (or not released), it seems reasonable to assume
that few of the targets in Pakistan were in the process of an “imminent”
attack. Consider the 2009 strike that killed Baitullah Mehsud. At the
moment the missile struck Mehsud’s hideout, one account states Mehsud
was on the roof receiving a massage,55 while another account states he was

49. Id.
50. Id. Gentile’s successor at Oxford, Hugo Grotius, “accepted something like the Caroline
test: preempting an attack if justified, but only if the attack is immediate and imminent in point of
time.” Id. Luban contrasts Grotius’ view with that of German natural law philosopher Samuel von
Pufendorf, who found Grotius’ view of only slightly useful. According to Luban, “[f]or
Pufendorf, fear alone can be a just cause but only if ‘we determine with a morally evident
certitude that there is an intention to hurt us.’” Id.
51. In this context, proportionate response should not be confused with the jus en bello
principle of proportionality.
52. See Luban supra note 44, at 2 (quoting Vattel).
53. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/
2002/; see DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.
54. George W. Bush, Foreword to NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at htto://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002.
55. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9.
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on the roof receiving medical care.56 So while it may be reasonable, even
prudent, to anticipate that Mehsud would organize further attacks, it is
unlikely that he was doing so while on the roof that day. Accordingly, the
jus ad bellum analysis depends on how one defines the parameters of selfdefense under Article 51. If self defense extends to a preventive use of
force, then where there is reliable intelligence of such a threat, the subsequent use of force against that threat in the form of a UAS strike is
permissible, even without Pakistan’s consent.
This analysis was predicated on the use of force in the territory of a
sovereign state without that state’s consent. Doing so invokes the U.N.
Charter when in reality it may not apply. That’s because
[t]he Charter does not directly regulate the resort to force within
states between government forces and non-state actors or between
non-state actor groups. This is an unfortunate gap in the law as the
most common form of armed conflict today is the internal armed
conflict, armed conflicts mostly within the boundaries of a single
state fought by groups contending for power or to secede.57
Turning to that characterization of conflict—a non-international armed
conflict—yields a different analysis but similar overall outcome.
2.

Non-International Armed Conflict

The alternative characterization of the conflict is that of a NIAC
between Pakistan on one side and organized armed groups operating from
the FATA on the other. An assumption implicit in this characterization is
that Pakistan consents to the UAS strikes and that the United States is either
assisting with Pakistan’s foreign internal defense or essentially acting as
Pakistan’s agent. The validity of the consent assumption is debatable.58
Pakistan has not publicly announced its view, rendering inquiry into the
relationship difficult.59 The basis for the assumption is that Pakistan has

56. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 11.
57. Id. at 16.
58. Sean Murphy, The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations
From Afghanistan Into Pakistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 79, 118-20 (2009) (describing the role of
Pakistan’s consent, or lack thereof, in the analysis into the legality of the UAS strikes).
59. Shane, supra note 20, at 2. Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial killings, stated that it is impossible to judge whether the UAV strikes violate international
law without knowing whether Pakistan consented. Id. That would seem to overstate the matter.
As this article explains, there is an analytical framework where Pakistan consents, and another—
primarily the Article 51 analysis—if it does not.
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knowledge of the strikes and the opportunity to formally and publicly
object to the strikes, but has not done so.60
For example, in early December 2009, the Prime Minister of Pakistan
said that United States UAS strikes in Pakistan “do no good, because they
boost anti-American resentment throughout the country.”61 Similarly, in
January 2010, the Pakistani Foreign Minister said that expanding UAS
strikes might “undermine” Pakistan’s relationship with the United States.62
While not ringing endorsements of the strikes, the statements do not
constitute an objection; in fact, the latter implies approval, but only to an
undefined point.63 On the other hand, in February 2010, the Washington
Post reported that
[a]lthough the Pakistani government publicly complains about the
drone attacks, it privately endorses the strategy under rules negotiated in mid-2008. This agreement permits the CIA to fire when it
has solid intelligence and to provide “concurrent notification” to
Pakistan, which typically means shortly after a Hellfire missile is
launched.64
As previously mentioned, Pakistani consent is assumed in order to
distinguish the two forms of NIAC for the purposes of breaking out the
analytical frameworks. Without that assumption, the United States, through
60. In the fall of 2008, the New York Times reported that an Obama administration official
said that “no tacit agreement had been reached to allow increased [UAS] strikes [in Pakistan] in
exchange for a backing off from additional American ground raids” referring to a September 3,
2009, raid by United States Special Operations personnel into Pakistan. Mark Mazzetti & Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, available
at http://www nytimes.com/2008/10/27/washington/27intel html.
According to the story,
“Pakistani officials have made clear in public statements that they regard the [UAS] attacks as a
less objectionable violation of Pakistani sovereignty.” Id. More recent media reports claim that
many of the American UAS strikes originate from a base in Pakistan and that their increased
frequency is the result of a March 2009 deal between the United States and Pakistan, which
provides Pakistanis greater control of the targets. Kitfield, supra note 11, at 6. According to
Kitfield, “[f]or domestic political consumption, Pakistan’s leaders promote the image of CIA
agents flying drones from its American headquarters, but the program clearly involves a high
degree of involvement by Americans inside Pakistan, and by the Pakistani government.” Id.
61. Shane, supra note 20, at 2.
62. Joby Warrick & Pamela Constable, Attacked CIA Facility Supported Drone Strikes,
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1.
63. See Interview with Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan with Zeinab
Badawi, Reporter, BBC NEWS, Pakistan FM: US Drones a Threat to Sovereignty (Dec. 1, 2009)
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/8388331.stm (claiming that the
Pakistani Foreign Minister referred to American UAV attacks as a threat to Pakistan’s
sovereignty). The solution according to the Foreign Minister was for the United States to transfer
its UAV technology to Pakistan, which presumably would continue the strikes. Id.
64. David Ignatius, What The Partisan Squabbles Miss On Obama’s Terror Response,
WASH. POST. Feb. 17, 2010, at A13; see also Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, CIA and Pakistan
Work Together, But Do So Warily, NY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at A1 (describing how the CIA and
Pakistan “are working together on tactical operations,” both drone strikes and ground raids).
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UAS strikes in the FATA, would be violating Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. As discussed in the prior example, the lawfulness inquiry would
begin by applying Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which requires that
member states refrain from the use or force or the threat thereof, as well as
the Article 51 self-defense provisions. But here, the assumption is that
United States action is at the behest of the Pakistan government. As such
there is not a jus ad bellum inquiry per se as the use of force by the United
States is not against the territorial integrity of Pakistan, but against their
shared enemy, organized armed groups operating in the FATA and eastern
Afghanistan.
While the characterization of the conflict in Pakistan—either in regards
to Pakistan or the United States, as well as whether Pakistan has consented
to UAS strikes—prompts different jus ad bellum analysis, the result is the
same: the UAS strikes are a lawful use of force. Such a result depends on
the position that preventive use of force may qualify as self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or in the alternative, that Pakistan has consented to the UAS strikes. But again, those conclusions address the
question of whether resorting to force is lawful. The actual conduct of a
UAS strike invokes a different construct and analysis.
B. JUS IN BELLO
Having considered jus ad bellum, the lawfulness of resorting to UAS
strikes, the inquiry shifts to jus en bello, the law governing the conduct of
the strikes themselves. As previously discussed, this analysis, like that
under jus ad bellum, occurs through the prism of the LOAC. The impact of
that point is more pronounced in the jus in bello analysis. The LOAC is the
more specific law (lex specialis) for regulating the conduct of hostilities.
Other, more general law (lex generalis), such as human rights law, may still
apply but its application, and interpretation, is through the LOAC. In
explaining the relationship between human rights law and the LOAC, the
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the threat or use
of nuclear opinions remains instructive. While considering the most
sacrosanct of human rights, the right to life, the ICJ stated that
[t]he protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right
to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not
arbitrarily to be deprived of [one’s] life applies also in hostilities.
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then
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falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the
conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life,
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant
itself.65
Accordingly, characterizations of UAS strikes using human rights
terms like assassination or extrajudicial killing are incorrect as they rely on
the lex generalis, human rights law, as opposed to the lex specialis, the
LOAC.66 That the LOAC is the applicable law in the FATA is borne out by
another international tribunal. In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal
of Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Tadic decision is instructive on two levels.67 First,
Tadic helps discern when an internal conflict rises to the level of an armed
conflict. Secondly, Tadic instructs as to the scope of the LOAC which
applies during such an armed conflict. As to the first point, according to the
ICTY,
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a state. International humanitarian law [LOAC]
applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of
peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved.
Until that moment, international

65. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 240
(July 8). See also Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Case No.
52207/99, 12 December 2001 (holding that NATO airstrikes in Kosovo did not constitute
effective control sufficient to trigger application of the European Convention of Human Rights).
66. See Harris, supra note 29 (describing how many experts “believe that some drone attacks
could rightly be called ‘extrajudicial killing,’” a conclusion requiring analysis under human rights
law, not the LOAC). Press Release, UN Expert Tells Third Committee No State Free from Human
Rights Violations; Accountability System Must Be Effective in as Many States as Possible
Committee Hears from Human Rights Council Experts on Education, Extrajudicial Execution,
Foreign Debt, As Two-Week Debate Continues, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3960 (Oct. 27, 2009)
(quoting Special Rapporteur Alston as stating that drone strikes “remained unchecked by rules
governing international humanitarian law”). Without listing any authority or basis, Alston goes
on to claim that the CIA had “determine[d] in complete isolation who, when, and where they
would kill and . . . insist[ed] that they were not subject to human rights or humanitarian law.” Id.
Yet the application of human rights instruments, domestically or extraterritorially, requires a state
to have effective control. Pakistan does not have effective control over the FATA, so state human
rights obligations are not triggered.
67. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001).

664

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:649

humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat
takes place there.68
In the case of the FATA, there is protracted armed violence between
Pakistan and the insurgents, which are “organized armed groups.”
Accordingly, the current environment is properly considered an armed
conflict and not some lesser form of internal disturbance, for which a law
enforcement framework might be more appropriate.69
The import of the determination that an armed conflict exists70 is
Tadic’s next contribution to the analysis. Under Tadic, where an armed
conflict exists, the full panoply of customary international law of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies to the jus in bello analysis.71 In
other words, the much broader and more developed rules governing IAC
apply to the NIAC in Pakistan.72 Notwithstanding it is the lex specialis, one
area where IHL is more developed and appropriate than human rights law is

68. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocatory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
69. See Int’l Inst. Of Humanitarian Law (ITHL), Manual on The Law of Non International
Armed Conflict With Commentary, at 2-3, available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/
Manual%5B1%5D.Final.Brill..pdf. Indicia of this lesser form of disturbance include riots and
sporadic or isolated acts of violence. Id. at 2.
70. One problem with this determination is that Pakistan has not acknowledged the existence
of a NIAC within its borders. In some ways this is not surprising. Despite more than a hundred
instances around the world over the last sixty years which may have constituted an armed conflict,
only two states have explicitly made that acknowledgment: El Salvador regarding its conflict in
the 1980s against the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and
Columbia’s long standing struggle with the Fuerzas Armados Revolucionaires de Columbia—
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC). Reasons why states do not acknowledge a NIAC include the
resulting implication that a state has lost control and increased chance that other states will
involve themselves. One offshoot of not acknowledging a NIAC is that the states subsequent use
of force is evaluated under a law enforcement, or human rights paradigm. Returning to UAS
strikes in Pakistan, one could argue that there is in essence a conflict of laws between how the
United States and Pakistan view the same conflict inside Pakistan. The disconcerting result is that
were Pakistan to employ UAS in the FATA, that use of force would be judged differently than a
similar UAS strike.
71. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 89 (Oct. 2, 1995) (describing the international
humanitarian law applicable during an armed conflict as the Hague and Geneva Conventions as
well as “customary rules on internal conflict” and even agreements binding between the parties to
the conflict which are not customary international law).
72. The United States would not likely utilize the Tadic analysis. Instead, the United States,
as a matter of policy, complies “with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such
conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” Directive 2311.01E, supra note
13, at ¶ 4.1. From the DoD perspective, the LOAC “encompasses all international law for the
conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and
international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary
international law.” Id. at ¶ 3.1 (emphasis added).
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in how targeting decisions are permissibly made and subsequently
evaluated.73
IV. TARGETING PRINCIPLES
The laws governing targeting are primarily derived from two sources.
The first is the Fourth 1907 Hague Convention, which regulates the “means
and methods” of warfare.74 The other source is the first two Additional
Protocols (AP) to the Geneva Conventions.75 According to one United
States law of war expert, the protocols arguably merged the Hague means
and methods tradition with the Geneva tradition of protecting victims of
warfare.76 This section will focus on the application of the AP I concepts of
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in the attack to UAS strikes.
The section concludes with a discussion about reciprocal responsibility and,
who, in the case of UAS strikes in the FATA, is doing the targeting.
A. DISTINCTION
The principle of distinction flows from the prohibition against
“[i]ndiscriminate attacks” which, among other limitations, are “not directed
at a specific military objective.”77 But do members of organized armed
groups in Pakistan constitute such an objective? The basic rule under
Article 48 of AP I is that “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct
their operations only against military objectives.”78

73. See Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. (forthcoming
2010).
74. See Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 48 (Adam Roberts and
Richard Guelff eds., Oxford University Press 1982).
75. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; 26
I.L.M 568 (1987).
76. Richard Jackson, Special Assistant on Law of War Matters Army Judge Advocate
General Corps, Panelist at the Willamette University College of Law Panel: Empirical
Approaches to the International Law of War (Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with author). While the
United States has not acceded to either AP I or AP II, the United States recognizes aspects of each
as customary international law. As Jackson notes, “more importantly, the United States complies
with these provisions in the relevant practice.” Id. at 9.
77. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(4).
78. AP I, supra note 75, art. 48.
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As a result, “[t]he civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations.”79 But civilians enjoy that protection “unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.”80 What constitutes direct participation
in hostilities is widely debated and the subject of recent interpretative
guidance by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).81 But
the situation in the FATA avoids much of that disagreement, because
members of an organized armed group do not qualify as civilians.82 Such
insurgents, through repeated direct participation in hostilities, perform what
amounts to a continuous combat function that does not warrant the status
and subsequent protections afforded civilians.83 Killing such insurgents is a
permissible military objective and, subject to the conduct of the attack, such
an attack is not indiscriminate.
Yet, the individuals who happen to be near the insurgents may be
entitled to the protections. While not the objective of the attack, such
individuals may still be wounded or killed in an UAS strike on an insurgent.
The principle of proportionality helps address whether their injury or death
causes the attack to be considered indiscriminate.
B. PROPORTIONALITY84
The principle of proportionality “reflects this balance between
humanitarian concerns and military necessity.”85 As one commentator
acknowledged, “[a]t its core, however, the principle of proportionality still

79. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(1).
80. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(3).
81. NILS MELZER, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW, 2009 [hereinafter DPH study]. While the DPH study involved input from several countries,
the final document is solely an ICRC product, reflecting that “the participants failed to reach a
consensus” in a process described as “highly contentious.” Harris, supra note 29, at 3.
82. DPH study, supra note 81, at 16.
83. DPH study, supra note 81, at 35. One difficulty is in parsing such members from those
performing a “spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular
operation.” Id.
84. See generally Kenneth Watkin, Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal
Rules, 8 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2005).
85. Jackson, supra note 76. The concept of military necessity is first reflected in article 23
of the Hague Convention. 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, supra note 74, at art. 23. The fact that military aims play a role in the analysis is seen in
the beginning of Hague IV, which was “inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far
as military requirements permit.” Id. at prmbl. (emphasis added). Jackson notes that this principle
is often lost in the targeting discussion. Jackson, supra note 76. While Jackson acknowledges this
occurs due to the laudable concerns on the humanitarian impacts of warfare, doing so alters the
essence of the law of war, which recognizes and attempts to balance both military necessity and
humanitarian concerns. Id.
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envisions that civilians may be harmed in the course of attacks against
legitimate military objectives.”86 AP I lays out the proportionality principle
by listing as indiscriminate “[a]n attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”87
Some mistakenly read the proportionality rule as lending itself to an
empirical analysis of comparing the numbers of civilians wounded to the
numbers of enemy, in this case insurgents, wounded or killed.88 While that
would make the application of the principle easier, the principle balances
civilians wounded and killed and damage to their property against military
advantage. Military advantage is a subjective determination the military
commander makes “based on his or her experience and evaluation of the
target in the context of the entire campaign, and the information reasonably
available at the relevant time.”89 As a general rule, proportionality does not
limit the amount or type of force used; it considers the expected results.90
The proportionality test is “much easier to formulate in principle than
to apply to a complex or uncertain set of circumstances. As a result,
military commanders and states have enjoyed a great deal of discretion in
making these evaluations.”91 To illustrate the application of proportionality, consider the August 2009 UAS strike that targeted and killed
Baitullah Mehsud. The attack also reportedly killed one to three other

86. Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409, 427 (2009).
87. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(5)(b).
88. See, e.g,. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 24. O’Connell incorrectly claims that “[f]ifty
civilians killed for one suspected combatant killed is a textbook example of a violation of the
proportionality principle.” Id. Since that is not even a correct recitation of the principle, it hardly
stands as a textbook example of its application. The balance is between the fifty civilians killed
and the military advantage anticipated from the death of the suspected combatant. Even if
O’Connell’s claim of a 50 to 1 ratio is correct, and recent analysis suggests it’s not, the identity of
that single combatant is key. For example, the view of 50 to 1 where the 1 is Mehsud or Osama
Bin Laden is different than where the 1 is a much lower level figure. As to O’Connell’s 50 to 1
claim, the New America Foundation reported in October 2009 that UAS strikes had killed
between 750 and 1000 people in Pakistan and that 66 to 68 percent of them were militants and
between 31 and 33 percent were civilians. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9. That analysis
leads to a ratio of one civilian killed for every two militants.
89. Jackson, supra note 76, at 10.
90. But see HCJ 769/02 The Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, at 29 [2005],
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (claiming that
Israel’s interpretation of proportionality results in adding an additional requirement to Israeli
forces that “a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed”). It is important to remember the occupation
setting, and attendant level of control, which underpins the case and decision.
91. Beard, supra note 86, at 428.
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members of al Qaeda, including Mehsud’s father in law, and two to four
people who were reportedly civilians, including Mehsud’s wife.92
Applying the principle of proportionality to the Mehsud strike results
in balancing the deaths of the two to four civilians and damage to the
building against the anticipated military advantage of killing the leader of
the Pakistani Taliban. But again, in addition to not being an empirical
analysis, the assessment is also not made with the benefit of hindsight, but
based on the information available to the commander at the time of the
strike.93 Recognizing that even in the UAS era, intelligence is not perfect,
the LOAC also mandates certain precautions before an attack.
C. PRECAUTIONS IN THE ATTACK
Article 57 of AP I outlines precautions to be taken before an attack.94
These begin with the requirement that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects.”95 Of note, Article 57 continues with the requirement
to “[d]o everything feasible” to verify that the target is a military objective
and to “[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”96
The United States endeavors to meet the requirements of Article 57 through
a variety of means. These include extensive intelligence gathering, preparing collateral damage estimates and “no strike lists,” and often the use of a
computer program to model the likely effects of a given weapon on a given
target and the area nearby.97
Here again, one finds very different applications of the same UAS
qualities to the rule providing for precautions in the attack. Specifically,

92. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9.
93. See Beard, supra note 86, at 436-437 (describing the United States attack on the Al
Firdos bunker during Operation Desert Storm). Prior to the attack, the United States possessed
intelligence that the bunker was being used as a headquarters for the Baath Party Secret Police.
While there were intelligence personnel in the bunker, Beard states that there were approximately
300 civilians in the bunker who were killed in the attack, including over 100 children. The
analysis of the Al Firdus bunker attack is not retrospective based on the tragic reality of the
civilians housed in the bunker but is based on the information the commander had before the
attack. Id. at 437. Beard notes that the United States claimed its intelligence assets at the time
were not able to detect that civilians were entering the bunker at night and questions how the
analysis might vary today. Id. Beard posits that “what was previously not legally feasible is being
radically altered by what is now operationally required.” Id. at 435 (emphasis in original).
94. AP I, supra note 75, at art. 57.
95. AP I, supra note 75, art. 57(1).
96. AP I, supra note 75, at art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
97. Jackson, supra note 76, at 11-12.
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UAS have the ability to loiter in the vicinity of a target area for hours,
beaming back high quality images in the process. One commentator labels
this attribute as terrifying to people, because UAS “fly for hours overhead,
hovering, filming, threatening to strike at any time.”98 Yet another considers that same “persistent surveillance” as “vastly expand[ing] the information resources available to military commanders” and in the process
redefining feasible precautions.99 If, and how much, increases in UAS
technology and prevalence shift the feasibility bar bears watching. In
directing UAS strikes in the FATA, the United States is obligated to comply with the distinction and proportionality principles and precautions in the
attack. But both the United States and the insurgents, like Mehsud, have an
obligation to limit casualties.
D. RECIPROCAL RESPONSIBILITY100
Article 58 of AP I states that parties to the conflict shall, “to the
maximum extent feasible . . . endeavor to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity
of military objectives.”101 Similarly, the parties shall “[a]void locating
military objectives within or near densely populated areas.”102 Yet
individuals like Mehsud deliberately place themselves in and amongst the
civilian population, with the result being either the United States reluctant
to attack or more civilian casualties if it does; however, the United States
will bear the blame, if not legally, then in the public relations context. The
Pakistan Taliban’s use of this tactic does not remove the United States from
its obligations discussed above. But it should factor into the analysis of
UAS targeting decisions and the inevitable post-strike discussion on the
strike’s legality. The Pakistan Taliban’s failure to meet their reciprocal
responsibilities under the LOAC may also factor into the proportionality
analysis. To the extent that the “civilians” that the Pakistan Taliban live
and operate among are considered voluntary human shields, then they are
considered to be directly participating in hostilities.103 As a result, they
could be permissibly targeted outright. Their death or injury, or damage to
their property, as the result of a UAS strike against the Pakistani Taliban
would not be considered collateral damage.

98. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 10.
99. Beard, supra note 86, at 434-35.
100. See generally Watts, supra note 38.
101. AP I, supra note 75, art. 58(a).
102. AP I, supra note 75, art. 58(b).
103. DPH study, supra note 81, at 13 n.6.

670

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:649

E. WHO CONTROLS THE UAS?
Much attention has been given to the question of who is controlling the
UAS being used in the strikes in the FATA. Is it the United States military?
The CIA? Contractors working for either? The significance of the answer
has been overblown. To the extent it is the United States military, they are
required to follow the LOAC. Many believe that the CIA is the lead agency
for the strikes in the FATA.104 Yet former CIA officials have stated that the
agency follows a LOAC-based targeting methodology.105 It would seem to
follow that to the extent contractors are involved at the behest of either the
DoD or CIA, they follow the process and procedures of those agencies,
including applying the LOAC. The only significance to a CIA operative or
contract employee controlling the UAS is that they become targetable under
the law of war and also lack the combatant immunity that law affords the
members of the military who comply with the LOAC. That is not to say
that their direct participation in the hostilities, by way of controlling a UAS
strike, is prohibited or a war crime. Instead, it means that they lack
immunity from the opposing state’s national law.106 But the reality in the
FATA is that the insurgents do not constitute an opposing state and the
strikes are apparently being conducted at the behest of Pakistan; thus, the
strikes constitute no more of a violation of Pakistani law than do the actions
of the Pakistani military and police who apply deadly force in the same
conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
Analyzing UAS strikes in Pakistan under both jus ad bellum and jus en
bello provides a useful vehicle by which to consider not only the ultimate
question of legality, but the framework used to do so. Implicit in the
analysis are questions that require a determination of the parameters of self
defense under the U.N. Charter, and even whether the Charter applies.

104. Mayer, supra note 4, at 2; Harris, supra note 29, at 1; Kitfield, supra note 11, at 8.
105. Harris, supra note 29, at 5-6.
106. DPH study, supra note 81, at 83-84 (“The absence in [the LOAC] of an express right
for civilians to directly participate in hostilities does not necessarily imply an international
prohibition of such participation. Indeed, as such, civilian direct participation in hostilities is
neither prohibited by IHL nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or current international
criminal tribunal or court. However, because civilians . . . are not entitled to the combatant
privilege, they do not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution for lawful acts of war, that is,
for having directly participated in hostilities while respecting IHL. Consequently, civilians who
have directly participated in hostilities and members of organized armed groups belonging to a
non-State party to a conflict may be prosecuted and punished to the extent that their activities,
their membership, or the harm caused by them is penalized under national law (as treason, arson,
murder, etc.).”).
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Similarly, how the conflict in the FATA is characterized, either internally
or externally, shapes the analysis, as does whether Pakistan consents to the
strikes.
This article argued that in the jus ad bellum context, UAS strikes are
permissible as preventive use of force in self defense if Pakistan does not
consent to the strikes. In the more likely event that Pakistan consents to the
strikes, then they are at the implicit behest of Pakistan as part of a conflict
against a mutual enemy. The LOAC informs the analysis at all stages,
particularly in terms of the conduct of the strikes themselves, jus en bello.
UAS raise situational awareness on the battlefield to unprecedented levels,
but this should not be mistaken for omniscience.
It is a certainty that UAS capabilities will continue to advance, posing
new challenges for the law in the process. What is uncertain is whether
baseline agreement can be reached as to even the applicable legal
framework in order to move from cognitive dissonance to constructive
dialogue.

